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ABSTRACT 
 
WORK AND HAPPINESS: ESTIMATING THE WELL-BEING IMPLICATIONS OF 
WORK HOUR REDUCTION 
By 
Mark Sefa Aboagye 
 
In many OECD countries, governments have passed legislations that seek to reduce the regular 
hours of work per worker. This has been largely due to increasing evidence on the negative 
implications of long hours of work on the health, well-being, and productivity of workers. This 
study answers the question, does a mandatory reduction in the regular hours of work affect the 
well-being of workers? We exploit a mandatory stepwise reduction in the regular hours of work 
in Korea from 2004 to estimate the impact using a staggered difference-in-difference 
specification. We find that while the policy improved the workers’ life satisfaction, it had no 
significant effect on job satisfaction nor labor income. This impact stems from increases in 
satisfaction with work hours, family relations, and social relations. We further found that male, 
older (above 40 years), and low- and average-income workers benefited more from this policy 
than their counterparts. 
JEL Codes: I31, M54, J08, J22, J28 
Keywords: Subjective well-being, work hours, Job Satisfaction, Life Satisfaction, Korea. 
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일과 행복: 근로시간 단축의 웰빙적 의미 추정 
 
마크 세파 아보아기 
 
많은 OECD 국가들에서, 정부는 근로자 1 인당 정규 노동 시간을 줄이려는 법안을 
통과시켰다. 이는 장시간 노동이 노동자의 건강, 웰빙, 생산성에 미치는 부정적인 
영향에 대한 증거가 증가했기 때문이다. 이 연구는 정규 노동 시간의 의무적인 단축이 
노동자들의 복지에 영향을 미치는가라는 질문에 대한 답을 준다. 우리는 2004년부터 
한국의 정규 근무시간을 단계적으로 단축하여 시차 차이에 대한 시차를 두고 그 영향을 
추정 우리는 그 정책이 노동자들의 삶의 만족도를 향상시켰지만, 그것이 직업 만족도나 
노동 소득에 큰 영향을 미치지 않았다는 것을 발견한다. 이러한 영향은 근무시간, 
가족관계, 사회관계 등에 대한 만족도가 증가함에 따라 발생한다. 또한 남성, 
고령자(40세 이상), 저소득 및 일반 근로자들이 상대 근로자들보다 이 정책의 혜택을 더 
많이 받는다는 사실을 발견했다. 
 
키워드: 주관적 웰빙, 근무시간, 직업만족도, 생활만족도, 대한민국. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The study of the socioeconomic consequences of long working hours has become an important 
issue in labor economics and occupational psychology in recent times. More specifically, 
recent studies have explored how prolonged hours of work affects workers (Golden & Wiens-
Tuers, 2006; Pouwels et al., 2008; Booth & van Ours, 2009; Wang, 2015). This growing 
interest stems from the prevalent notion, supported by empirical evidence (Kivimäki et al., 
2015; Afonso et al., 2017; Fadel et al., 2019), that working for long hours is pernicious to the 
well-being and health of workers. Moreover, it has been found that long hours of work may 
hamper the productivity of workers and increase the rate of truancy and injury at the workplace 
(Pencavel, 2015).  
Although there is a growing body of literature that studies how the hours worked by individuals 
affect their well-being, this literature shows little agreement on the direction and nature of the 
linkage between these variables. Whereas studies like Pouwels et al. (2008) demonstrate that 
life satisfaction and work hours are negatively correlated, other studies (Rätzel, 2009; Knabe 
& Rätzel, 2010; Muffels & Kempermann, 2011; Wang, 2015) rather found an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the two variables. Moreover, there are studies (Booth & van Ours, 
2009; Willson & Dickerson, 2010)  that could not establish any significant relationship between 
the two variables. Even more so, other studies such as Wooden et al. (2009) argue that in the 
determination of an individual’s well-being, the total work hours of the individual is not as 
important as the discrepancy between the individual’s preferred hours and the actual hours. 
While the extant literature has focused on the ramifications of long hours of work, to the best 
of my knowledge, only a few have considered the effect of government interventions meant to 
reduce working hours on workers’ well-being. Even more so, less attention has been paid to 
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the workers’ perception of well-being. Estimating this effect is even more critical now when 
more governments around the world continue to pass work hour reduction legislations in their 
quest to ameliorate the established health, productivity and employment consequences of long 
working hours as well as to improve the well-being of their labor force (Kivimäki et al., 2015; 
Pencavel, 2015; Afonso et al., 2017; Fadel et al., 2019). As a matter of fact, countries such as 
Sweden, France, Germany, Portugal, Japan, Finland, South Korea, etc. have in the past decades 
legislated an abatement of the standard work hours. 
According to Schwab (2017), governments usually resort to labor market legislation as a means 
to remedy diverse market failures. Most frequently, it is justified as a tool to enhance the well-
being of a particular group of people in the economy, especially workers. However, the 
research and discourse usually tend to focus more on the overall labor market effect of the 
legislation using so-called objective measures of well-being. These studies tend to neglect the 
perception of the affected groups and individuals about the effect of the legislation on their 
well-being – a gap which this study intends to bridge. 
Hence, this study quantitatively explores the impact of reduced work hours on workers’ 
subjective well-being in the context of an exogenous reduction in the length of the standard 
workweek of Korea in 2004.  We attempt to address the question: what are the implications of 
work hour legislation for workers’ well-being? More specifically, We identify the general 
relationship between well-being and work hours and estimate the hours at which various 
subjective well-being measures are maximized. We also try to answer the question: do workers 
increase their overtime hours to compensate for the lost time? Furthermore, the study answers 
the questions: are there any gender, age, or income level differences in how workers’ well-
being is affected by the policy? and how are they affected by government-legislated work hour 
reduction? However, this paper is not intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of global 
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work hour reduction policies since similar policies in other countries may have different 
impacts due to the differences in cultural, administrative and legal systems.  
The empirical analysis employs the KLIPS (Korea Labor and Income Panel Study) dataset 
from 2001 to 2015 for the general work hour-well-being analysis and from 2001 to 2009 for 
the policy analysis to estimates the policy’s Average Treatment Effect (ATE) using a staggered 
difference-in-difference combined with fixed-effect (FE) estimation framework. 
The findings confirmed the inverted U-shaped correlation between SWB and hours of work. 
Furthermore, we found that while the policy increased life satisfaction, it had no effect on job 
satisfaction. More specifically, the positive effect was a result of increases in satisfaction with 
work hours, satisfaction with family relations and satisfaction with social relations. We also 
found that effect of the policy was more dominant in male workers, older workers (above 40 
years), and low- and average-income workers. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into six main parts. Part 2 discusses related extant 
literature on the topic. This is followed by Part 3 which outlines the data and methodology used 
in the empirical analysis. The next part then reports the results of the analyses on how working 
hours influence the various subjective well-being measures. Part 5 discusses the implications 
of the findings. Finally, Part 6 concludes the study with recommendations for policy and 
research. 
1.2 The Policy 
Historically, Korea has been known for long working hours. It is known to have one of the 
longest working hours among OECD countries. Until the 1950s, Korea did not have any law 
which formally set the standard workweek. The first attempt to regulate working hours was in 
1953 when the Labor Standard Act was enacted. It was the first legislation that standardized 
working hours across all sectors (all firms with more than 5 employees or more) by pegging 
 
4 
 
the standard workweek at 48 hours and also mandating payment for overtime work. In efforts 
to improve the living conditions of employees and to reach OECD standards, subsequent 
reforms were made in 1989 and 1998 to reduce the working hours to 46 hours and 44 hours 
respectively. 
In September 2003, the Korean government passed the legislation – an amendment of the Labor 
Standard Act – which mandated all firms in Korea to adopt a 40 hours’ standard workweek 
starting from July 2004. This amendment reduced standard work hours in a week from 44 to 
40 hours. The policy aimed to improve the quality of life as well as promote a well-balanced 
economy. According to this law, the regular work hours per week should not exceed 40 hours, 
meaning the maximum regular work hours per day was pegged at 8 hours. The implementation 
of this law was to be done gradually in six phases based on the number of employees a firm 
has. Starting from firms with 1000 or more employees in July 2004, the policy was to be 
adopted gradually till 2011 when firms with less than 20 employees were also required to join. 
The table below (Table 1.0) gives a breakdown of the implementation schedule.1 
Table 1.0: Five-Day Workweek Implementation Schedule 
Phase Firm size 
Implementation 
Date 
1 Employees ≥ 1000 July 2004 
2 300 ≥ Employees < 1000 July 2005 
3 100 ≥ Employees < 300 July 2006 
4 50 ≥ Employees < 100 July 2007 
5 20 ≥ Employees < 50 July 2008 
6 Employees < 20 By 2011 
Note: ‘≥’ means greater than or equal to and ‘<’ means less than. 
This legislation, besides reducing working hours, changed the overtime policy as well as the 
annual leave allocation. The maximum overtime hours allowed under this policy were 12 hours 
                                                 
1 For more details on the law, read Article 49 of the Korea Labor Standard Law, Act No. 6974 (September 15, 
2013) 
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on weekdays and 16 hours on weekends for which workers were entitled to an overtime wage 
rate of 150% of their ordinary wage rate. Moreover, employees may choose paid time off (PTO) 
instead of overtime pay. This is similar to Compensation Time Off in the US, where workers 
may choose a paid vacation time rather than an overtime wage. Furthermore, the number of 
days an employee was entitled to paid annual leave was increased from 10 days to 15 days. 
Additionally, employers were required to compensate their employees for unused annual leave. 
Although the government continues to make efforts to decrease regular working hours, the 
average actual work hours of Korean workers is still relatively high. For instance, according to 
OECD statistics in 2008, Korea’s annual average work hours were 2,228 hours, the highest 
among OECD countries. This was about 36% higher than that of Germany, and more than 20% 
higher than that of the US, Japan, and the OECD average. Even in recent years, the number is 
considered high as it averaged 1,993 hours in 2018 which was 259 hours more than the OECD 
average (OECD, 2020). Figure 1.1 shows a graphical representation of how work hours have 
changed since 2001 in some OECD countries. 
Figure 1.1 – Evolution of Work Hours in OECD Countries 
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1.3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
According to the standard neoclassical economic theory of labor supply, an hour of work 
produces ‘marginal disutility’, which is commensurate to an hour’s loss of leisure (Clark, 1973). 
This model is based on the theory that individual happiness or well-being is maximized through 
a combination of the consumption of goods and leisure. To be able to consume goods, however, 
the individual needs to devote some of his/her time to work to earn income. This is known as 
the consumption-leisure tradeoff model which posits that individuals have to make an 
economic tradeoff between using their time to work in order to earn income for consumption 
and using their time for leisure activities. In other words, if an individual works less, he/she 
can consume more leisure and fewer goods, and vice versa. Thus, while work in itself decreases 
satisfaction, the income generated from it increases satisfaction making the net effect 
ambiguous.  
However, some studies on the so-called ‘psychic income’ suggest that aside from the monetary 
rewards (income), some workers attach value to the job in itself. This means individuals get 
some level of direct satisfaction or happiness from doing a particular job. This may be due to 
factors that are known to significantly influence individual happiness such as social 
participation and engagement or the nonpecuniary benefits such as friends, fame, power, etc. 
(Phillips, 1967; Farzin & Akao, 2011). 2 
The orthodox approach to assessing the link between work and satisfaction is to specify a 
framework that identifies employment as a critical determinant of life satisfaction. In such 
models, researchers try to estimate how an individual’s employment status affects his/her 
subjective well-being whiles holding constant other factors such as household income level. 
Among such models is the one that uses the number of hours worked as a predictor of the well-
                                                 
2 See (Fetter, 1927) Chapter 3: Goods and Psychic Income and (Dorman, 2014) page 355 for more details. 
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being of both workers and their families. Nevertheless, this method of estimation has produced 
mixed and ambiguous results. While some researchers found a positive relationship, others 
found a negative relationship (Pouwels et al., 2008). Moreover, others found an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the two variables (Knabe & Rätzel, 2010) whiles others found no 
significant relationship (Booth & Van Ours, 2008; Willson & Dickerson, 2010).  
The ambiguity surrounding this relationship is mainly because most of the empirical models 
used to estimate the relationship between the two variables (work hours and happiness) usually 
face two fundamental issues: endogeneity and functional form misspecification. First, 
endogeneity usually stems from the fact that fluctuations in working hours are very hardly 
exogenous of individual characteristics. This means individuals self-select into the sample 
based on some individual characteristics that are likely to be correlated to life satisfaction. This 
increases the possibility of omitted variable bias especially when the individual characteristics 
are not measurable. Moreover, there may be a confounding variable that affects both working 
hours, happiness and income simultaneously. Second, some researchers ignore the fact that the 
relationship may not always be linear. This is mainly because finding the right functional form 
for working hours in the model may prove to be a daunting task. This may lead to naive 
estimates that could be misleading. Hence, a majority of the studies looking at this relationship 
usually do very little to make causal inferences. In other words, many of these studies generally 
do not go beyond correlation analysis.  
The following conceptual framework sets the stage for the empirical analysis. According to the 
standard neoclassical theory of labor supply, workers have to make a tradeoff between work 
and leisure. Thus, we assume there would be generally two types of workers (1) those who 
prefer leisure and (2) those who prefer to work. The legislation of shortening the workweek 
would affect the utility of both workers differently. For the first worker who prefers leisure, a 
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reduction in work hours would positively affect his/her utility. However, for the second worker 
who prefers to work more, the legislation would negatively affect his/her utility.  
The effect of the legislation on their utility would also exhume different responses from the 
workers with regards to compensating for the reduced hours. The worker whose utility is 
positively affected would either not change or even possibly reduce his/her overtime work 
hours (based on the assumption that he/she would use the new free time for leisure activities). 
On the other hand, the worker whose utility is negatively affected would try to compensate for 
the lost utility by either increasing his/her overtime work hours or if possible, take a part-time 
job (based on the assumption that work increases his/her utility more than leisure). 
To test whether the changes in overtime work hours are not merely as a result of changes in 
wage, we use the wage elasticity of overtime labor supply (percentage change in overtime hours 
divided by the percentage change in wages). If the elasticity is equal to zero, this indicates that 
the workers’ utility increased (although wages changed, their overtime hours remained 
constant). However, if the elasticity is undefined (infinity), this means the policy failed to 
achieve its purpose of increasing the utility of workers (their overtime hours increased despite 
no change in wages). Figure 1.2 shows a graphical representation of this framework. 
Figure 1.2 – Conceptual Framework 
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RELATED LITERATURE 
Having discussed the policy and the theoretical basis for this study, in this section we review 
the extant literature on working hours and well-being. Before the review, it is important to 
clarify the meaning of well-being given its central role in this study. In traditional economic 
theory, well-being is usually equated to income levels or the satisfaction derived from the 
consumption of goods. Generally, economists use income levels of individuals as a measure of 
well-being. However, this method of measuring utility or individual happiness is inadequate as 
it ignores the non-market aspects of individual well-being (Easterlin, 1995; Holländer, 2001; 
Clark et al., 2008). Hence, our use of well-being in this study refers to subjective well-being 
(SWB, henceforth). According to Edward Diener, one of the most cited authors on SWB, SWB 
is “a person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her life as a whole. These evaluations 
include emotional evaluations of events as well as cognitive judgments of satisfaction and 
fulfillment” (Diener et al., 2002, p.63). Thus, in this context, SWB refers to how people 
evaluate their happiness and overall life satisfaction. Moreover, in this study, we use SWB, 
happiness, and utility interchangeably since it has been found (Diener et al., 2002; Golden & 
Wiens-Tuers, 2006; Veenhoven, 2012; Diener, 2020) to generally have a similar meaning. 
The literature on SWB has generally received scant attention in economics and public policy. 
This is mainly because, until recent decades, economic researchers rejected empirical studies 
on SWB, citing various issues with the reliability and validity of SWB data (Easterlin, 2001; 
Holländer, 2001; Krueger & Schkade, 2008; Fischer, 2009). However, Holländer (2001) argues 
that the term ‘utility’ is overly abstract and without accepting measures of SWB, economists 
cannot make their usual welfare and policy inferences. According to him, SWB is not only 
measurable but has also been proven to have theoretical precision. Hence, in recent decades, 
the number of empirical studies that use SWB measures for economic analysis has increased 
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rapidly (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1998; Di Tella et al., 2001; Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004; 
Van Praag & Baarsma, 2005; Clark, 2003; Luechinger, 2009; Clark & D’Ambrosio, 2015). 
Although many of the studies hardly agree on a similar array of determinants of SWB, the 
employment status of individuals has been found, by a majority of them, to significantly affect 
SWB (Clark & Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998; Blanchflower & Oswald, 
2004). Clark and Oswald (1994), using measures of mental well-being to estimate the disutility 
of unemployment, found that the level of life satisfaction was higher among employed persons 
than their unemployed counterparts. Their findings revealed that unemployment caused more 
unhappiness than marriage separation (Clark & Oswald, 1994). Other studies have also found 
similar results, especially the fact that unemployment and welfare of individuals have a strong 
negative correlation (Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998; Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004). 
According to Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), the welfare loss or unhappiness produced by 
unemployment is proportionately higher than the consequent loss of income. This is, however, 
inconsistent with the neoclassical theory of labor supply which posits that work only produces 
disutility. 
Despite the increase in the economic literature on the relationship between employment and 
SWB, the researchers generally concentrate on the work hours and job satisfaction relationship 
(Clark & Oswald, 1994; van Praag et al., 2003). Even among the studies which estimate this 
relationship, they have uncertain results. For example, while Clark and Oswald (1994) found a 
weak negative correlation between the two variables, van Praag et al. (2003) rather found an 
inconclusive relationship. Moreover, other studies estimate how working hour flexibility 
affects job satisfaction (Origo & Pagani, 2006; Kelliher & Anderson, 2008; McNall et al., 2009; 
Grözinger et al., 2010; Kelliher & Anderson, 2010; Hanglberger, 2012). Grözinger et al. (2010) 
found that preferences in work hours are highly correlated with job satisfaction. This is 
consistent with the other studies which argue that current arrangements of work hours have a 
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toll on the satisfaction of workers, since in most countries, work hours are rarely flexible. 
Similarly, based on data from Germany, Hanglberger (2012) found that, especially among full-
time workers,  the higher the workers’ ability to choose their hours, the higher their level of job 
satisfaction. However, Kelliher and Anderson (2008) argue that while working hour flexibility 
positively affects job satisfaction, it comes at a perceived cost of losing opportunities for career 
advancement.   
Another related growing body of literature is the effect of work hours, especially long periods 
of work, on family well-being (Major et al., 2002; Golden & Wiens-Tuers, 2006; Hughes & 
Parkes, 2007). Workers are often faced with the challenge of balancing their limited time 
between work and spending time with their families. Especially for married couples and 
employees with children, making this decision is sometimes quite daunting.3 According to 
Golden and Wiens-Tuers (2006), long hours of work, including overtime work, negatively 
affect family well-being. Similarly, Major et al. (2002) argue that the higher the work hours, 
the more work interferes with family which negatively affects family well-being. Additionally, 
Hughes and Parkes (2007) argue that long working hours have negative effects because it 
complicates the ability of the individual to find a proper balance between his/her family 
responsibilities and the job. 
Notwithstanding, some recent papers concentrate on the general SWB effects of working hours 
by estimating the linkages between life satisfaction and work hours while controlling for 
individual or household income (Booth & Van Ours, 2008; Pouwels et al., 2008; Booth & van 
Ours, 2009; Rätzel, 2009; Wooden et al., 2009; Knabe & Rätzel, 2010; Willson & Dickerson, 
2010). Among the first studies to make this estimation is Pouwels et. al (2008) which found 
that work hours and life satisfaction are negatively correlated, however, only significant among 
                                                 
3 This is a well-documented fact with a broad literature especially in occupational psychology. Studies such as 
Michel et al. (2011) show how this leads to role strain and work-family conflict.  
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male workers. This estimation was, however, based on only a single cross-sectional dataset 
rendering it inadequate for causal inference. In a similar study, Knabe and Rätzel (2010) used 
a longitudinal version of the same dataset and allowed for nonlinearity. They argued that while 
working hours had an inverted U-shaped relationship with life satisfaction, the effect was rather 
negligible. Other studies (Rätzel, 2009; Muffels & Kempermann, 2011) using the same dataset 
confirm that the work hours-happiness curve is inverse U-shaped. Other researchers did not 
find any significant effect (Booth & Van Ours, 2008; Booth & van Ours, 2009; Willson & 
Dickerson, 2010). Even more so, other studies such as Wooden et al. (2009) found that in the 
determination of an individual’s well-being, the total work hours of the individual is not as 
important as the discrepancy between the individual’s preferred hours and the actual hours. 
One common thing about many of these studies is that they generally estimate a model where 
they equate SWB to a function of average weekly work hours (W), income (I), and other 
explanatory variables (X’). This can be mathematically depicted as 𝑆𝑊𝐵 𝑓 𝑊, 𝐼, 𝑋 . 
Moreover, they use a linear specification while only a few allow for nonlinearity (Knabe & 
Rätzel, 2010; Muffels & Kempermann, 2011). However, this framework has fundamental 
issues such as reverse causality and functional form misspecification. These issues generally 
make the interpretation of estimates very limited and sometimes problematic. 
Considering the above issues, some recent studies have exploited variations in work hours to 
estimate its impact on happiness (Rudolf, 2014; Collewet & Loog, 2015; Wang, 2015; 
Lepinteur, 2019). Using data from Korea and exploiting the 2004 mandatory work hour 
reduction in Korea, Rudolf (2014) found that although there was a significant increase in 
satisfaction with work hours, life and job satisfaction were not significantly affected. A similar 
work by Collewet and Loog (2015), taking advantage of an exogenous variation in work hours 
among German public sector workers, found that life satisfaction and hours of work have an 
inverted U-shaped relationship among full-time employees. Particularly for men, the estimated 
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relationship between additional hours and happiness was negative, while the relationship was 
insignificant for their female counterparts (Collewet & Loog, 2015). Likewise, Wang (2015) 
used Korean data and a government-induced change in work hours to estimate the impact of 
long hours on several measures of SWB. Allowing for non-linear relationships between the 
variables, the study argues that, long hours of work have a significant impact on work hour-
related happiness, but a negligible effect on income-related happiness. This means the work 
hour reduction may only have an impact on satisfaction with work hours and leisure (Wang, 
2015). Also exploiting mandatory changes in the overtime policies in Portugal and France, 
Lepinteur (2019) found that reduced work hours increased both satisfaction with leisure and 
job satisfaction. 
The review suggests that despite the increase in literature on this topic, the findings do not 
converge. This is because work hours are highly endogenous; even when a mandatory change 
is imposed, it might be affected by factors that simultaneously affect the well-being of workers. 
Furthermore, work hours, working conditions, work ethics, and economic conditions vary 
greatly among countries, thus causing the findings to differ. Another reason could be the 
robustness of the estimation methods used.  
Hence, this study employs various robust estimation methods that allow for the elimination of 
endogeneity and account for unobserved regional and employee heterogeneity. Furthermore, it 
goes beyond the estimation of the impact of the policy on happiness, to estimate its impact on 
overtime work and wages. This will allow for checking how consistent the results of possible 
changes in happiness are in the context of changes in overtime hours and income. Therefore, 
this study tries to expand the literature which, so far, only focuses on the changes in life 
satisfaction with no consideration for corresponding changes in overtime variables from both 
employers and employees. The study further does a decomposition analysis to estimate the 
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gender, age, and income level differences in the well-being responses to a reduction in work 
hours. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data and Variables 
The empirical analysis employs 10 waves of the KLIPS dataset from 2001 to 2015. KLIPS is 
a nationally representative longitudinal survey conducted by the Korea Labor Institute. It is 
conducted on about 5,000 urban households and its over 13,780 individual members aged 15 
years and above. The survey has been held annually since its launch in 1998 with the latest 
publicly available wave conducted in 2017 (wave 20). 4  The survey uses a standardized 
questionnaire that covers an array of labor-related topics such as earnings, household income, 
and expenditure, economic activity, life satisfaction, education, vocational training, labor 
market mobility, demographics, etc. The survey maintains an excellent performance and 
retention rate with an average retention rate of over 76% of the initial sample.5 
Major variables central to this study included in the dataset are the two main subjective well-
being questions – general life satisfaction and job satisfaction – which are further decomposed 
into more specific domain questions. For general life satisfaction, it specifically asks “Overall, 
how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life?”. It further requires respondents to use the 
same 5-point interval scale for this question “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the 
following aspects of your life?” Leisure, Household Income, Social relations, Family relations, 
etc. For job satisfaction, the survey specifically asks “Overall, how are you satisfied or 
dissatisfied with your main job?”. Moreover, it asks specific domain questions which might be 
related to the reduction in working hours such as “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with 
the following aspects of your main job?” Working hours, Wages/earnings, etc. 
                                                 
4 The datasets are available on the KLI website to download online free of charge  
5 According to Korea Labor Institute, the retention rate in the 2nd wave (1999) was 87.6%, 80.9% in 2000. After 
wave 4 in 2001, with a retention rate of 77.3%, it stabilized at an attrition rate of 1% per annum. The latest 
wave, 2017, had a retention rate of 67.1%. 
 
16 
 
There are five response categories to each of the above-mentioned questions, which is a Likert-
scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1= “Very satisfied”, 2= “Satisfied”, 3= “Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied”, 4= “Dissatisfied” and 5= “Very dissatisfied”. During the empirical analysis, these 
satisfaction variables are reverse coded so that 1= “Very Dissatisfied” and 5= “Very satisfied” 
for the sake of convenience and easy reference. Thus, the reverse coding allows for the higher 
values to indicate higher satisfaction and vice versa. We consider satisfaction with leisure, 
household income, family relations, and working hours in addition to job satisfaction because 
they could be important channels for the possible changes in life satisfaction (happiness) after 
the reduction in work hours. 
The data is restricted to observations aged 20 to 65 since those are the usual ages at which most 
people are economically active. In other words, most people enter the labor force at about age 
20 and exit or retire from the labor force usually after age 65. It is further restricted to only 
wage-workers since the policy mainly targeted full-time wage workers. In the dataset, the 
wage-workers are further divided into two groups based on the type of work hours, whether 
full-time or part-time, which allows for the distinction between eligible and non-eligible 
individual workers.  
We construct an eligibility variable to indicate whether an individual was eligible for a 
reduction in their work hours at a particular time or not. Since the policy sought to shorten the 
workweek of full-time workers from 44 hours to 40 hours, it is logical to assume that part-time 
workers and full-time workers who worked less than or equal to 40 hours were not eligible for 
this legislation. Thus, those who were eligible were full-time workers whose average weekly 
work hours exceeded 40 hours in 2003. Additionally, the information on firm size is used to 
determine which members of the eligible group were treated in which particular year as there 
was a staggered adoption of the work hour reduction policy based on the firm size. Furthermore, 
the sample for the policy is restricted to only those with data in 2003. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Total Eligible Non-eligible Others
Life satisfaction 3.37 3.38 3.26 3.37
 (0.60) (0.59) (0.65) (0.60) 
Satisfaction with household income 2.91 2.93 2.77 2.92
 (0.72) (0.72) (0.77) (0.71) 
Satisfaction with leisure 3.06 3.06 2.96 3.08
 (0.72) (0.73) (0.75) (0.70) 
Satisfaction with family relations 3.65 3.69 3.59 3.63
 (0.60) (0.59) (0.65) (0.60) 
Satisfaction with social relations 3.49 3.50 3.44 3.49
 (0.58) (0.58) (0.60) (0.57) 
Job satisfaction 3.23 3.24 3.14 3.24
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.69) (0.63) 
Satisfaction with work hours 3.21 3.17 3.18 3.24
 (0.77) (0.79) (0.77) (0.76) 
Satisfaction with wages or earnings 2.85 2.85 2.76 2.86
 (0.76) (0.76) (0.80) (0.75) 
Observations 67,821 29,052 6,708 32,061
Notes: This table presents averages across all the years for the whole sample and as well as the eligible, non-
eligible sample, and the rest who are not included in the policy analysis. The standard deviations are shown in 
parenthesis. The sample for this summary statistics is restricted to wage-workers. All the variables are on a 5-
point scale with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 5. The eligible group consists of full-time wage workers 
whose average weekly work hours in 2003 was more than 40 hours whilst the non-eligible group is composed of 
those whose average weekly work hours were 40 or less and part-time wage workers. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the means and standard deviations of the SWB measures, which make up the 
main dependent variables. The mean of overall life satisfaction which is 3.37 (above the 
midpoint – neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) is greater than that of satisfaction with leisure and 
satisfaction with household income which are 3.06 and 2.91 respectively. While the former is 
above the midpoint, the latter is below. However, the average satisfaction with family relations 
and social relations, which are 3.65 and 3.49, are greater than overall life satisfaction. They 
have the highest averages among all the measures of satisfaction considered. The average job 
satisfaction (3.23) is a little bit higher than that of satisfaction with working hours and wages 
which are 3.21 and 2.85 respectively. Although the differences in satisfaction between the two 
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samples are not significant, it is worthy to note that, in all of the measures except for satisfaction 
with work hours, the eligible group is more satisfied than their non-eligible counterparts. This 
is an indication that those who work less than 40 hours weekly are happier with their work 
hours than those who work above 40 hours. 
The KLIPS also contains comprehensive demographic and socioeconomic information, some 
of which were used as control variables in the analysis. They include household income, level 
of education, gender, age, number of kids, and marital status. The ‘highest level of education 
attained’ variable is converted into 8 dummy variables (ranging from no schooling to 
doctorate). Similarly, gender and marital status variables are converted into dummy variables. 
Also, the log form of the household income is used for convenient interpretation.  
For further policy analysis of the corresponding impact on wage elasticity of overtime labor 
supply, other dependent variables including average weekly overtime hours and average 
weekly overtime wages are used. Some observations indicated unrealistic overtime hours, as 
high as 400 hours. Thus, we peg the maximum overtime hours at 40 hours. Additionally, we 
calculate the average weekly overtime wages using information from the monthly wages and 
weekly overtime hours. we divide the average monthly wages by a factor of the average weekly 
work hours and 4.33 to get the hourly wage rate ( ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠   
.    
 ).  
Given that the Korea Labor Standard Law requires employers to pay a 50% overtime premium, 
we multiply the average weekly overtime work hours a factor of 1.5 and the hourly wage rate 
to get the average weekly overtime wage ( 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 1.5 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ). Furthermore, the overtime wages variable 
is used in its log forms – Log of average weekly overtime wages.  
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 Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Total Eligible Non-eligible Others
Average weekly work hours 47.9 50.7 41.7 46.6
 (13.5) (12.7) (15.2) (13.2)
Work hours squared (divided by 100) 24.8 27.4 19.7 23.5
 (14.3) (14.8) (14.2) (13.5)
Age 40.3 41.8 43.3 38.2
 (10.8) (10.3) (10.7) (10.9)
Female 0.40 0.32 0.53 0.44
 (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50)
Married 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.68
 (0.43) (0.39) (0.38) (0.47)
Number of kids ( 0 ~ 6yrs) 0.26 0.26 0.19 0.28
 (0.57) (0.57) (0.51) (0.59)
Number of kids ( 7 ~12yrs) 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.20
 (0.55) (0.59) (0.56) (0.50)
Number of kids ( 13 ~ 15yrs) 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Total Household Income (log) 8.13 8.15 7.98 8.13
 (0.71) (0.68) (0.78) (0.72)
Level of 
Education 
No schooling 0.0055 0.0063 0.012 0.0034
 (0.074) (0.079) (0.11) (0.058)
Elementary School 0.065 0.069 0.14 0.047
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.34) (0.21)
Lower Secondary School 0.094 0.10 0.14 0.075
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.35) (0.26)
Upper Secondary 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.33
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
Associate Degree/Vocational 0.17 0.16 0.096 0.20
 (0.38) (0.36) (0.29) (0.40)
College 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.30
 (0.44) (0.43) (0.39) (0.46)
Masters 0.043 0.041 0.065 0.039
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19)
Doctorate 0.0091 0.0073 0.018 0.0088
 (0.095) (0.085) (0.13) (0.093)
Other Variables     
Average weekly overtime pay (log) 2.58 2.56 2.47 2.63
 (0.85) (0.87) (0.90) (0.83)
Average weekly overtime hours 10.4 9.96 9.67 11.1
 (8.12) (7.66) (7.89) (8.64)
Observations 68,114 29,166 6,722 32,226
Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. This table presents averages across all the years for the whole 
sample and as well as the eligible, non-eligible sample, and the rest who are not included in the policy analysis. 
The standard deviations are shown in parenthesis. The eligible group consists of full-time wage workers whose 
average weekly work hours in 2003 was more than 40 hours whilst the non-eligible group is composed of those 
whose average weekly work hours were 40 or less and part-time wage workers. 
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In the dataset, some participants indicated average weekly work hours as high as 168 hours. 
These high average weekly work hours are unrealistic considering that in the whole week there 
is a maximum of 168 hours. This could be an error; thus, following Wang (2015), we peg the 
average weekly work hours at a maximum of 100 hours. Furthermore, we include the square 
of the average weekly work hours to allow for nonlinear estimation. 
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the main explanatory variables and others. There 
are 68,114 total observations composed of 29,166 ‘eligible’ observations, 6,722 ‘non-eligible’ 
observations and 32,226 observations which are excluded from the policy analysis. Out of the 
total observations, 40% of them are females, 75% are married, and the average age is 40.3 years 
(the non-eligible group, on average, have older workers). The average weekly work hours in 
the total sample are 47.9 hours which is very high compared to the government prescribed work 
hour limit. A further decomposition reveals that the eligible group works an average of 50.7 
hours per week, whiles the non-eligible group, even though it is dominated by part-time 
workers, have average weekly work hours of 41.7 (also more than the legislated 40 hours).  
This is an indication that on average, the hours worked, even for part-time workers, is more 
than the government prescribed hours. 
Overall, most of the people, making up 35% of the sample, on average have a high school 
diploma. This is followed by 26% college-degree holders, 17% 2-year professional or 
vocational diploma holders, 6.5% elementary school leavers, 4.3% masters-degree holders, and 
0.91% doctorate-degree holders. However, it is also evident that the eligible group (full-time 
workers) are, on average, more educated (12.3 years) than the non-eligible group (11.8 years) 
which is mostly made up of part-time workers. The average weekly overtime working hours 
are 10.4 hours which is also high among the eligible group than the non-eligible group. 
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3.2 Empirical Strategy 
The basic model used to test the relationship between the various subjective well-being 
measures and work hours is based on a panel fixed-effect estimation as below: 
𝑌 𝛽 𝛽 𝑊 𝛽 𝑊 𝑋′ 𝛺 𝛼 𝜗 𝜖     (1) 
where 𝑌  is the outcome variable of interest including life satisfaction, satisfaction with leisure, 
satisfaction with income, satisfaction with family relations, job satisfaction, satisfaction with 
work hours, and satisfaction with wages of individual i in year t; 𝑊  and 𝑊  indicate the 
average weekly work hours and its square respectively, 𝑋  represents a vector of time-variant 
observable individual characteristics, 𝛼  represents time-invariant individual characteristics, 𝜗 
is the year fixed-effects which controls for the effect of annual shocks which affects all 
individuals in all firms sizes such as the global financial crises in 2008, and 𝜖 is the error terms 
which assumes a normal distribution. 𝛽  and 𝛽  are the main coefficients of interest which are 
expected to be negative as the work hours increase past a certain threshold (in this case we 
assume this relationship would be evident when work hours go beyond the proposed forty 
hours). The dependent variables are standardized for a convenient interpretation of the 
estimation results. 
The above specification only estimates the general SWB and work hour relationship. However, 
to isolate the causal impact of the shorter workweek legislation on well-being, we estimate the 
average treatment effects using the difference-in-difference (DID) method.  
Let 𝑌  represent the utility (well-being) of the individual (i) who works at a firm with a total 
number of employees or firm size (f) at the time (t). At a particular time, the work hours of 
employees at firm size f are reduced. However, consider only full-time workers with an average 
weekly work hour of more than 40 as the only eligible ones for the reduction. This assumption 
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is based on the fact that the policy reduced working hours to 40 hours and targeted full-time 
workers. Thus, full-time workers who were already working 40 hours or less and part-time 
workers were not eligible for a reduction under the policy. 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸  is an indicator variable 
that is equal to 1 if the individual (i) was eligible for the work hour reduction (treatment group) 
and equal to 0 if the individual is not eligible for a work hour reduction (control group). The 
indicator variable 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇  is equal to 1 for all periods after the adoption of the policy for a firm 
with size f and is equal to 0 for all periods prior to the adoption of the policy. Let 𝛼  represent 
all the time-invariant individual characteristics (individual fixed effect), 𝜗  represent the 
annual shocks which affect all individuals (time fixed effect), and 𝜖  represent the stochastic 
error term. The general difference-in-difference model for the well-being of the individual is 
written as:  
𝑌  𝛿 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝛿 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡𝑓 𝜋𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝛼 𝜗 𝜖  
               
Where π estimates the expected change in the utility of the eligible group minus the expected 
change in the utility of the non-eligible group. 
𝜋 𝐸 𝑌 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 1 𝐸 𝑌 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 0  
         
𝐸 𝑌 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 0 𝐸 𝑌 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 0 ) 
   
However, since the time for the adoption of the policy varied based on the firm size, our 
specification will be a special variant of the general difference-in-difference specification using 
the “staggered adoption design” (Athey & Imbens, 2018). We allow the treatment period 
(POST) to vary based on the firm size (f) of the individual workers (i). This estimation assumes 
that the treatment effect does not change across all the treatment periods. The modified model 
is specified as follows: 
𝑌  𝛿 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝛿 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝜋 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝛼 𝜗 𝜖  
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Failure to control for observable individual variables may annul the common trends assumption. 
Thus, equation (4) is modified to include individual-level characteristics such as age, marital 
status, number of kids between the ages of 0 to high school, level of education, and a single 
household level characteristic, total annual household income. Furthermore, to prevent any 
biases, we further control for firm size fixed effects assuming that the utility of workers in 
larger firms may be affected by some factors which might not affect the workers of smaller 
firms and vice versa. Additionally, since the policy was implemented based on firm size, it is 
only reasonable to control for unobservable firm size-related characteristics. Finally, we control 
for the individual’s unobservable characteristics related to their region of residence (regional 
fixed effects). The final model is specified as follows: 
𝑌  𝛿 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝛿 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝜋 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝑋′ 𝛺 𝛼 𝜗 𝜌 𝜏 𝜖  
where 𝜋 is the coefficient of interest and is expected to be positive if the policy improved the 
well-being of the workers. 𝑋′  is a vector of observable time-variant individual characteristics, 
𝜌  is the firm size fixed effects, and 𝜏  measures the regional fixed effects. We use a 2-way 
clustering method for the standard errors; since the policy was implemented at a particular time 
based on the individual’s firm size, we cluster the standard errors at firm size times year. 
Furthermore, as stated in the conceptual framework, we conduct a second-level verification to 
see if workers increased their overtime hours to compensate for the ‘lost’ hours of work. We 
do this by measuring the wage elasticity of overtime labor supply.  
𝑂𝑉𝑇  𝛿 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝛿 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝜔 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝑋′ 𝛺 𝛼 𝜗 𝜌 𝜏 𝜖  
𝑊  𝛿 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝛿 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝜎 𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝑋′ 𝛺 𝛼 𝜗 𝜌 𝜏 𝜖  
Where 𝑂𝑉𝑇  indicates the average weekly overtime hours and 𝑊  indicates the log of hourly 
wage. 𝜔 and 𝜎 represent the average change in weekly overtime hours and log of hourly wage 
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respectively. Thus, the wage elasticity of labor supply (ℇ) is written as follows: 
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℇ
∆𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘
∆𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
𝜔
 𝜎
 
The Difference-in-difference (DID) estimation is based on the common trends assumption 
which states that in the absence of the treatment (policy), the rate of change of the dependent 
variable for both the treatment group and control group should be the same (Angrist & Pischke, 
2008). This means whilst both groups do not necessarily need to be on the same level, the 
difference in the rate of change of the dependent variable between both groups should not be 
significantly different from zero. To validate this assumption, we run a falsification test using 
a ‘fake’ treatment year. Finally, since the dataset does not provide details on actual compliance 
with the policy, the estimation uses the eligibility status of an individual for treatment based 
on the assumption that all eligible workers had their work hours reduced, not who was actually 
treated. Thus, we can say this is an intention-to-treat (ITT) estimation. 
  
(8) 
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RESULTS  
4.1 Evolution of Work Hours and Well-being 
Before presenting the main regression results, we summarize the evolution of work hours and 
the SWB variables from 2001 to 2015 in this section. 
4.1.1 Evolution of Working Hours 
This section provides an overview of how working hours have changed over the years. The 
analysis shows a substantial decrease in work hours. 
Figure 4.1: Evolution of Work Hours 
 
Figure 4.1 shows a continuous decrease in average weekly work hours since 2001. In 2004 
during the first year of implementation of the legislation, there was a fall in work hours from a 
little over 50.5 hours to 49.5 hours (1-hour decrease). Between 2007 and 2008, there was a 
sharp decrease from 48.5 to 47 hours which marks the highest annual reduction during the 
implementation years. It continued to reduce to about 45.5 hours in the final year of 
implementation. This marks a decrease on work hours by approximately 5 hours during the 
years of implementations. As at 2015, it had further decreased to approximately 44.5 hours. 
Comparing the eligible and non-eligible groups reveals an interesting trend. Among the eligible 
group, work hours started to drop from 2003 when the policy was approved even before its 
implementation in 2004, whereas work hours sharply increased among the non-eligible 
workers mostly made up of part-time workers. In 2004 when the policy was initially rolled out 
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through to 2011 when the policy was expected to have been adopted by every firm, average 
work hours continued to drop among the eligible group. On the other hand, work hours 
increased among the non-eligible group. It is evident that after the policy, the wide gap in 
working hours between the two groups closed significantly. 
4.1.2 Evolution of Well-being 
This section describes the changes in the various measures of SWB over the years. The trends 
indicate that, on average, well-being has increased over the years with a few exceptions where 
it dropped for a short stint and then recovered. The left-hand side graph of Figure 4.2 shows 
that in 2002, there was an approximately 3% increase in overall life satisfaction. However, it 
decreased by about 0.3%, a year prior to the policy’s introduction. After the introduction of the 
policy, average life satisfaction increased steadily at an increasing rate of approximately 1.2% 
until 2009 when it began to slow down. The right-hand side diagram shows the trend based on 
a decomposition of the sample into eligible and non-eligible observations. It indicates that, on 
average, the eligible workers, over the years, have always had a higher level of life satisfaction 
than their non-eligible counterparts. Although there is a gap between both groups, the 
fluctuations in their life satisfaction levels follow a similar trend. 
Figure 4.2: Evolution of life satisfaction 
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The evolution of job satisfaction has not been significantly different from that of life 
satisfaction. However, it must be noted that life satisfaction has over the years been higher than 
job satisfaction. This could be an indication that job satisfaction is a constituent of life 
satisfaction and not vice versa. From Figure 4.3, it is evident that job satisfaction sharply 
increased by 2.46% in 2001, however, in 2002 the growth rate slowed down. Moreover, in 
2003, prior to the introduction of the policy, job satisfaction experienced a decrease of about 
0.98%. A year after the introduction of the policy, job satisfaction levels reached above 3.1 
which is a 1.87% increase from the previous year. After the introduction of the policy, similar 
to life satisfaction, job satisfaction levels increased steadily at a rate of 1.6% until 2009 when 
it slowed down and began to decrease starting from 2012. It, however, increased from 2014 to 
2015. Resembling the trend in life satisfaction, the members of the eligible group have a higher 
level of job satisfaction than the non-eligible workers. In 2012, however, the disparity in job 
satisfaction between the two groups of workers reduced drastically. While life satisfaction gap 
between the two groups seem to be diverging after 2011, the job satisfaction levels seem to be 
converging during the same period. 
Figure 4.3: Evolution of Job Satisfaction 
As seen from the descriptive statistics, the other SWB measures, besides life and job 
satisfaction follow a similar trend. Figure 4.4 shows that satisfaction with household income, 
satisfaction with leisure, satisfaction with family relations, satisfaction with earnings and 
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satisfaction with work hours continue to increase. However, this increase is not very significant 
as compared to life satisfaction and job satisfaction. Another interesting observation is that 
satisfaction with family and social relations are relatively very high. In fact, satisfaction with 
family relations is even higher than both life satisfaction and job satisfaction. Nonetheless, the 
gap between satisfaction with family relations and the other measures, although very high, has 
reduced drastically since the introduction of the policy in 2004. 
Figure 4.4: Evolution of other measures of well-being. 
 
4.2 Relationship between Well-being and Work Hours 
In this section, we report the findings of the fixed-effects regression of equation (1) which 
estimates the well-being and work hour relationship. In this estimation, we regress a quadratic 
function of average weekly work hours of the total sample on the 8 well-being measures under 
consideration. We control for various individual and household characteristics including age, 
level of education, marital status, number of kids, etc.  
Table 4.1 contains the regression results. Column (1) reports the estimates of a specification 
with no control variables, column (2) reports the results of a specification with the full set of 
control variables plus individual and year fixed effects, and column (3) adds regional fixed 
effects to control for any disparities peculiar to a particular region of residence. The results in 
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column (2) and column (3) indicate, although modest, a statistically significant non-linear 
relationship between life satisfaction and work hours which is inverted U-shaped.  
Table 4.1: Relationship between Life Satisfaction and Work Hours   
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Average weekly work hours 0.0048** 0.0036* 0.0036*
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Work Hours Squared (divided by 100)  -0.0046
** -0.0037** -0.0038** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.0214*** 0.0213***
 (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.2301*** 0.2340***
 (0.028) (0.028)
Total Household Income (log)  0.1379
*** 0.1371***
(0.010) (0.010)
Number of kids (0 ~ 6yrs)   -0.0226 -0.0235 
(0.012) (0.012)
Number of kids (7 ~12yrs)  -0.0158 -0.0159
(0.011) (0.011)
Number of kids (13 ~ 15yrs)  0.0135 0.0143
(0.039) (0.039)
Individual Controls NO YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect NO NO YES 
Observations 67,738 66,801 66,801
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.357 0.358 
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates for the 2001 to 2015 sample. The dependent variable is standardized 
for easy interpretation of the results. Robust Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Other 
control variables include 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Further calculations with the coefficients of Work Hours (W),  0.003605𝑊 . ), 
show that the optimal number of hours required to maximize life satisfaction is 48.04 hours. 
This means when work hours fall below or rises above 48.04 hours, life satisfaction falls. 
Furthermore, the table shows that a 1-year increase in age increases life satisfaction by 0.021 
standard deviations, the life satisfaction of married people is 0.24 standard deviations higher 
than unmarried workers, and a 1 percentage point increase in household income increases life 
satisfaction by 0.14 standard deviations. 
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Table 4.2 reports the results for the relationship between job satisfaction and work hours. The 
estimates in column (3), which are more robust with controls for individual, year, and regional 
fixed effects, indicate that there is a non-linear relationship, which is inverted U-shaped, 
between the two variables and is statistically significant at 0.001. In fact, job satisfaction is 
maximized when work hours are set at an average of approximately 43 hours per week. The 
other indicators show that a 1-year increase in age corresponds to a job satisfaction increase of 
0.02 standard deviations, and a household income increase of 1% corresponds to a job 
satisfaction increase of 0.098 standard deviations. 
Table 4.2: Relationship between Job Satisfaction and Work Hours  
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Average weekly work hours 0.0084*** 0.0078*** 0.0077***
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Work Hours Squared (divided by 100) -0.0095*** -0.0090*** -0.0090*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.0221*** 0.0221***
 (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.0509 0.0503
 (0.027) (0.027)
Total Household Income (log) 0.0980*** 0.0981***
 (0.010) (0.010)
Number of kids (0 ~ 6yrs) -0.0102 -0.0110
 (0.013) (0.013)
Number of kids (7 ~12yrs) 0.0022 0.0021
 (0.011) (0.011)
Number of kids (13 ~ 15yrs) 0.0588 0.0587
 (0.038) (0.038)
Individual Controls NO YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Regional Fixed Effect NO NO YES
Observations 67,674 66,738 66,738
Adjusted R2 0.359 0.362 0.362
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates for the 2001 to 2015 sample. The dependent variable is standardized 
for easy interpretation of the results. Robust Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Other 
control variables include 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4.3 reports the estimates of the regression of work hours on the life satisfaction channels. 
Both satisfaction with leisure and satisfaction with household income have a statistically 
significant inverted U-shaped relationship with work hours. Both of these measures are 
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maximized when employees spend an average of 22.2 hours and 50 hours per week respectively. 
However, the regression on satisfaction with social relations shows a significant U-shaped 
relationship whereas satisfaction with family relations, although it shows a U-shaped 
relationship, is not statistically significant. 
Table 4.3: Relationship between Channels of Life Satisfaction and Work Hours  
 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Satisfaction 
with 
Household 
Income
Satisfaction 
with 
Leisure 
Satisfaction 
with Social 
Relations 
Satisfaction 
with Family 
Relations 
Average weekly work hours 0.006*** 0.004* -0.004* -0.002
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Work Hours Squared (/100) -0.006*** -0.009*** 0.004** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.000 -0.007***
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.052 0.008 0.191*** 0.264***
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031)
Total Household Income (log) 0.245*** 0.124*** 0.081*** 0.100***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of kids (0 ~ 6yrs) -0.051*** -0.062*** 0.001 0.032*
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of kids (7 ~12yrs) -0.023* -0.015 0.001 -0.003
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of kids (13 ~ 15yrs) 0.008 0.008 -0.019 -0.059
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045)
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Observations 66,802 66,797 66,798 66,798
R2 0.506 0.441 0.393 0.414
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates for the 2001 to 2015 sample. The dependent variable is standardized 
for easy interpretation of the results. Robust Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Other 
control variables include 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4.4 reports the results for the association between satisfaction with work hours and work 
hours (Column 1) and satisfaction with wages/earnings and work hours (Column 2). For 
satisfaction with work hours, although it also shows an inverted U-shaped relationship, it looks 
as if at any level of work hours, satisfaction with work hours is negative. On the other hand, 
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estimates for satisfaction with wages or earnings are statistically significant showing an 
inverted U-shaped correlation. Satisfaction with wages is maximized at approximately 50 hours 
per week whiles satisfaction with work hours will be maximized when current hours are 
reduced by approximately 14 hours. 
Table 4.4: Relationship between Channels of Job Satisfaction and Work Hours  
 (1) (2) 
Variables 
Satisfaction with 
Work Hours      
Satisfaction with 
Wages/Earnings     
Average weekly work hours -0.004* 0.007***
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Work Hours Squared (/100) -0.014*** -0.007***
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Age 0.020*** 0.022***
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Married -0.033 0.035 
 (0.029) (0.031) 
Total Household Income (log) 0.060*** 0.129***
(0.010) (0.010) 
Number of kids (0 ~ 6yrs) 0.001 -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Number of kids (7 ~12yrs) 0.023* -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Number of kids (13 ~ 15yrs) 0.034 0.093* 
 (0.048) (0.041) 
Individual Controls YES YES 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES 
Observations 66,805 66,812 
R2 0.460 0.440 
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates for the 2001 to 2015 sample. The dependent variable is standardized 
for easy interpretation of the results. Robust Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Other 
control variables include 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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4.3 Impact of the policy 
After estimating the general association between well-being and work hours, we now estimate 
the impact of the policy. This section reports the regression results based on equation (5) to 
evaluate the impact of the policy on well-being, work hours, income, and overtime work and 
wages. Although the adoption of the policy started in 2004 and ended in 2011, in this analysis 
we use data from 2001 to 2009. This is because there was a strict and systematic adoption of 
the policy annually based on firm size from 2004 up until 2008 when all firms, except those 
with less than 20 workers, had adopted it. For the firms with less than 20 workers, they were 
given the freedom to gradually reduce their working hours between 2009 and 2011 with no 
specific rule on when exactly to adopt it. This means it would be difficult to determine the 
exact year in which a particular firm with less than 20 workers adopted the policy. Thus, for 
accuracy, we limit the policy analysis to the years with specific rules on when to adopt the 
policy. 
4.3.1 Balance Test 
One condition required for estimating causality between two variables is randomization  
(Angrist & Pischke, 2008). This means selection into the sample for the analysis should be 
random. Since this study is based on a quasi-experimental design, we can only ensure 
randomization if we select a sample with no systematic difference between the control and 
treatment groups at the baseline. This section uses the balance test to check for any systematic 
differences between the two groups based on some individual covariates in 2003. Table 4.5 
reports the results of the balance test based on individual covariates such as age, marital status, 
number of kids (from newborn babies to high school students), level of education and 
household income. Column 1 reports the averages for the non-eligible group (control), column 
2 for the eligible group (treated), and column 3 is the differences between the two groups 
(treatment group average minus control group average). The non-eligible workers are, on 
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average, about 1.75 years older than the eligible workers. However, an age gap less than two 
years cannot be considered as a very significant difference in this context. Similarly, the 
eligible workers have on average, about 0.66 more years of schooling which is about 8 months. 
This difference is also not very significant in this context. However, the annual household 
income of the eligible workers is about KRW1.86 million more than the non-eligible workers. 
Finally, for marital status and the number of kids, there is no systematic difference. Even 
though we found a few differences in age, level of education and household income, it is still 
safe to assume that the sample is very close to random. However, to prevent these minor 
differences from biasing the estimates, we include both the variables that show differences and 
those that do not show differences as control variables. 
Table 4.5: Balance Test at the Baseline – 2003. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Control Treatment Diff(T-C)
Age 39.619 37.914 -1.705***
  (11.530) (10.681) (0.417)
Married 0.747 0.723 -0.024
  (0.435) (0.448) (0.017)
Number of kids (0yrs~highschool) 0.780 0.792 0.012
  (0.940) (0.923) (0.036)
Total years of schooling 11.957 12.617 0.661***
  (4.125) (3.273) (0.133)
Total Household Income (log) 7.706 7.892 0.186***
  (0.889) (0.659) (0.028)
Observations 858 3,244 4,102
Notes: This table reports the differences between the control group and the treatment group at the baseline (2003).  
Standard errors in parentheses.   * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
4.3.2 Falsification Test 
Before we estimate the impact of the policy, we first test the common trends assumption which 
states that without the policy, there would have been no systematic difference in the rate of 
change in the well-being of the eligible and non-eligible workers (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). 
To do this, we conduct a falsification test by estimating equation (5). However, we use a 
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placebo treatment year (2002). While the adoption of the policy started in 2004, in this test, we 
assume that all the eligible workers were treated in 2002. The expectation is that if the common 
trends assumption holds, then the DID estimator would not be significantly different from zero. 
Tables 4.6 reports the results for the falsification test. In column 1, we do not include any 
individual control variables, whilst in column 2, we add various individual control variables. 
In column 3, which is the most robust among all three, we include firm size fixed effects and 
regional fixed effects. As expected, the estimates from all the three specifications are not 
statistically significant. 
Table 4.6: Falsification Test Using 2002 as Treatment Year 
 (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Dependent Variable – Life Satisfaction      
DID (Placebo x Eligibility) 0.024 0.031 0.030
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) 
Individual Controls YES YES YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect NO NO YES 
Regional Fixed Effect NO NO YES
Observations 24,819 24,642 24,642
R2 0.469 0.474 0.475 
  
Panel A: Dependent Variable – Job Satisfaction         
DID (Placebo x Eligibility) 0.061 0.043 0.043
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.042)
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect NO NO YES
Regional Fixed Effect NO NO YES 
Observations 24,764 24,587 24,587
R2 0.486 0.489 0.489
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
4.3.3 Impact on Life Satisfaction 
This section analyses the policy’s effect on life satisfaction and its related channels. Table 4.7 
reports the estimates of the OLS regression based on equation (5) which shows the effect of 
the policy on life satisfaction. In column 1, we do not include any individual control variables, 
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whilst in column 2, we add various individual control variables. In column 3, which is the most 
robust among all three, we include firm size fixed effects and regional fixed effects. The 
estimates of the three specifications are not significantly different from each other. Column 3 
reports that the policy positively affected life satisfaction. The difference-in-difference 
estimator shows that life satisfaction increased by 0.19 standard deviations which is statistically 
significant. This means the policy achieved its purpose of improving the well-being (overall 
life satisfaction) of the workers as expected. 
Table 4.7: Impact of the Policy on Life Satisfaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Post -0.1991*** -0.1985** -0.2077***
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.1801** 0.1778** 0.1782**
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Individual Controls YES YES YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect NO NO YES
Regional Fixed Effect NO NO YES
Observations 17,339 17,227 17,227
R2 0.474 0.479 0.481
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate). 
In this estimation, we assume that the pre-introduction period is 2001 and the post-introduction period is all years 
after 2002.   * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
We, additionally, evaluate the impact of the policy on the channels of life satisfaction including 
satisfaction with leisure, household income, family relations, and social relations. Table 4.8 
presents the regression estimates of the overall life satisfaction channels. Column 1 contains 
the estimates of the policy’s effect on satisfaction with household income, column 2 
satisfaction with leisure, column 3 satisfaction with social relations, and column 4 satisfaction 
with family relations. While Column 1 and column 2 show negative and positive effects on 
satisfaction with household income and leisure respectively, both estimates are not statistically 
significant. However, in column 3 and column 4, the estimates indicate a positive impact of the 
policy on satisfaction with social relations and family relations respectively. While satisfaction 
with social relations increased by 0.17 standard deviations, satisfaction with family relations 
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increased by 0.26 standard deviations, both of which are statistically significant. This indicates 
that the increase in overall life satisfaction is a result of increases in satisfaction with family 
and social relations due to the reduced work hours. 
Table 4.8: Impact of the Policy on Life Satisfaction Channels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Satisfaction 
with 
Household 
Income     
Satisfaction 
with Leisure
Satisfaction 
with Social 
Relations 
Satisfaction 
with 
Family 
Relations
Post 0.0504 -0.1092 -0.1947** -0.3192***
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.057) (0.063)
DID (Post x Eligibility) -0.0721 0.0993 0.1683** 0.2598***
 (0.069) (0.073) (0.060) (0.066)
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 17,226 17,224 17,222 17,223
R2 0.528 0.449 0.406 0.437
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
4.3.4 Impact on Job Satisfaction 
Table 4.9 reports the OLS regression results based on equation (2) which shows the policy’s 
effect on job satisfaction.  
Table 4.9: Impact of the Policy on Job Satisfaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Post  -0.0351 -0.0397 -0.0538
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.059)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.1120 0.1133 0.1202
 (0.064) (0.062) (0.061)
Individual Controls NO YES YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect NO NO YES
Regional Fixed Effect NO NO YES
Observations 17,292 17,180 17,180
R2 0.483 0.486 0.487
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The column 1 specification does not have any individual control variables, whilst in column 2, 
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we add various individual control variables. In column 3, which is the most robust among all 
three, we incorporate firm-size fixed effects and regional fixed effects. The estimates are robust 
to all three specifications. Although the estimates indicate an increase in job satisfaction due to 
the policy, they are not statistically significant. This means the policy did not have any 
significant influence on job satisfaction. 
We further estimate the impact of the policy on the channels of job satisfaction. Table 4.10 
reports the regression results for the job-related channels of well-being. While column 1 reports 
the results for the policy’s effect on satisfaction with work hours, column 2 reports the 
estimates of the policy’s effect on satisfaction with wages or earnings. The policy, per the 
results, had a positive impact on satisfaction with work hours. More specifically, after the 
policy’s adoption, satisfaction with work hours increased by 0.26 standard deviations. However, 
there was no statistically significant impact of the policy on satisfaction with wages or earnings. 
Table 4.10: Impact of the Policy on Job Satisfaction-related Channels 
 (1) (2) 
 Satisfaction with 
Work Hours      
Satisfaction with 
Wages/Earnings   
Post  -0.2182*** 0.0553 
 (0.054) (0.066) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.2625*** 0.0149 
 (0.054) (0.063) 
Individual Controls YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES 
Observations 17,223 17,230 
R2 0.466 0.468 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
4.3.5 Impact on Income 
While the main focus of this paper is to estimate how the policy affected subjective well-being, 
it would also be interesting to know how it affected the income of the workers since income 
has been found to be a major channel for variations in subjective well-being. Therefore, in this 
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section, we estimate the policy’s effect on the labor income of the workers using the average 
monthly wage to represent earned labor income. 
Table 4.11: Impact on Income (Average Monthly Wages) 
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Post 24.463*** 22.432*** 21.899***
 (5.961) (5.675) (5.784)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 5.466 5.946 6.450
 (6.489) (6.187) (6.157) 
Individual Controls NO YES YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect NO NO YES 
Regional Fixed Effect NO NO YES
Observations 17,357 17,249 17,249 
Adjusted R2 0.575 0.583 0.582
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include the log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 4.11 reports the impact of the policy on the labor income (average monthly wage) of the 
workers. Column (1) reports the estimates of the specification without control variables, in 
column (2) we include the full set of control variables but not firm and regional fixed effects, 
and in column (3) we include the firm and regional fixed effects. The estimates indicate that 
the policy did not have any statistically significant effect on the wages of the eligible workers. 
Although not statistically significant, we can see that the monthly wages increased by 
approximately KRW 60,000. However, since the estimates are not statistically significant, we 
can conclude that the policy did not significantly affect the income of the workers. 
 
4.3.6 Impact on Work Hours 
Table 4.12 reports the estimates of the impact of the policy on average weekly work hours. 
While column 1 contains the estimates for the full sample, columns 2 and 3 present the 
estimates for the female and male subsamples respectively. In all three specifications, we 
control for individual, year, regional and firm size fixed effects. The column 1 estimates 
indicate that the policy had a negative impact on average weekly work hours. Specifically, 
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average weekly work hours decreased by approximately 5.6 hours (about 336 minutes). 
Moreover, comparing column 2 and column 3 reveals that the decrease in work hours does not 
significantly differ between females and males. 
Table 4.12: Impact of the Policy on Average Weekly Work Hours 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Full Sample Female Male 
Post 3.9036*** 3.8670** 3.6202*
 (1.100) (1.172) (1.430) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) -5.5706*** -5.0788*** -5.1311***
 (1.165) (1.272) (1.473) 
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES 
Observations 17,303 6,299 11,004 
R2 0.544 0.556 0.527 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
4.3.7 Impact on Overtime Work Hours and Wages 
As discussed above, the policy also has the potential to affect overtime work hours and wages. 
We can use this analysis to verify whether those who were happy with the reduced work hours 
maintained or even reduced their overtime hours and/or those who were unhappy with the 
policy increased their overtime hours to compensate for the reduced hours. The hourly wage 
analysis allows us to verify whether the change in overtime work (if any) is purely a result of 
wage change or as a result of the policy. 
Table 4.13 reports the results for the impact of the policy on average weekly overtime work 
hours (column 1) and average hourly wages (column 2). In both estimations, we control for 
individual, year, firm size and regional fixed effects, as well as individual control variables. 
Although not reported, other specifications without the regional and firm size fixed effects 
produce similar estimates. The results in column 1 indicate that there was no change in average 
weekly overtime work hours; although not significant, it shows a decrease in overtime work. 
 
41 
 
However, in column 2, we find that the average hourly wage increased by 5 percentage points. 
This indicates that, even though hourly wages increased, on average, it did not motivate 
workers to increase their overtime (elasticity (ℇ)=0); thus, we can state that the average worker 
was satisfied with the policy.  
Table 4.13: Impact of the Policy on Overtime Work and Wages 
 (1) (2) 
Variables 
Average Weekly 
Overtime Hours
Average Hourly 
Wages (Log) 
Post 0.4732 0.0150 
 (0.272) (0.020) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) -0.1494 0.0525* 
 (0.322) (0.021) 
Individual Controls YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES 
Observations 17,303 17,249 
R2 0.430 0.795 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
4.4 Heterogeneity Analysis 
One way to identify heterogeneity in the effect of the policy is to measure the policy’s effect 
on different subsamples. In this section, we conduct various decomposition analyses of the 
impact of the policy based on the individual and household characteristics of the workers such 
as gender, household income levels, and age. 
4.4.1 Gender Heterogeneity 
One way to examine the different well-being responses to the policy is to analyze the impact 
of the policy for each gender subsample.  
Table 4.14 reports the results of the gender heterogeneity estimation for life satisfaction and 
job satisfaction. Panel A reports the estimates for the female subsample while Panel B presents 
that of the male subsample. The four columns show two different specifications for both life 
satisfaction and job satisfaction. The estimates in Panel A imply that the policy had no 
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significant influence on the life satisfaction and job satisfaction of the female workers. 
However, in Panel B column (4) the results indicate that the policy had a statistically significant 
impact on the male workers’ life satisfaction; the policy increased life satisfaction by 
approximately 0.20 standard deviations for the male workers. This indicates that the change in 
overall life satisfaction was driven by the effect of the policy on the male workers but not the 
female workers. 
Table 4.14: Heterogeneity by Gender – Life Satisfaction and Job Satisfaction 
 Life Satisfaction Job Satisfaction
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
  
Panel A: Females  
Post -0.1891* -0.1990* -0.0607 -0.0748
 (0.094) (0.096) (0.074) (0.078) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.1448 0.1493 0.0947 0.0851
 (0.095) (0.099) (0.086) (0.087)
Individual Controls NO YES NO YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES
Regional Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES
Observations 6,308 6,270 6,287 6,249 
R2 0.483 0.489 0.464 0.471
  
Panel B: Males     
Post -0.2059** -0.2193** -0.0126 -0.0306
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.082) (0.080)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.1983** 0.2015** 0.1058 0.1149
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.081) (0.077)
Individual Controls NO YES NO YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES 
Regional Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES
Observations 11,031 10,957 11,005 10,931
R2 0.466 0.475 0.492 0.498
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
We further estimate the gender heterogeneity in the impact of the policy on the channels of life 
and job satisfaction. Table 4.15 reports the results of the gender heterogeneity estimation for 
satisfaction with work hours, wages/earnings, leisure, household income, family relations, and 
social relations.  
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Table 4.15: Heterogeneity by Gender – Other Measures of Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Work Hours   Wage/ 
Earnings    
Leisure    Household 
Income     
Family 
Relations    
Social 
Relations    
Panel A: Females   
Post  -0.1291 0.0924 -0.0502 0.0225 -0.3389*** -0.3746***
 (0.089) (0.091) (0.087) (0.094) (0.089) (0.093) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.1763 -0.0744 0.0193 -0.0969 0.2280* 0.2741** 
 (0.102) (0.093) (0.107) (0.107) (0.103) (0.099) 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,263 6,269 6,271 6,274 6,272 6,271 
R2 0.469 0.448 0.478 0.548 0.434 0.414 
   
Panel B: Males   
Post  -0.2766*** 0.0300 -0.1681* 0.0633 -0.3059*** -0.0477 
 (0.072) (0.080) (0.073) (0.067) (0.085) (0.056)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.3105*** 0.0498 0.1674* -0.0599 0.2736** 0.0599 
 (0.064) (0.076) (0.077) (0.075) (0.082) (0.057) 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 10,960 10,961 10,953 10,952 10,951 10,951 
R2 0.464 0.480 0.429 0.518 0.437 0.402
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The results in column (1) indicate that the policy had a statistically significant positive effect 
(0.31 standard deviation increase) on the satisfaction with hours of the male workers but no 
significant impact on that of the female workers. Similarly, whilst there was an increase of 
about 0.17 standard deviation in the satisfaction with leisure of the male workers, there was no 
impact on that of the female workers. However, the estimates in column 6 indicate that there 
was a statistically significant 0.27 standard deviations increase in the female workers’ 
satisfaction with social relations while there was none for that of the male workers.  Finally, 
column 5 shows that there was an increase of 0.23 standard deviations and 0.27 standard 
deviations in the satisfaction with family relations of the female and male workers respectively, 
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both of which are statistically significant. Although there was no overall effect of the policy on 
satisfaction with leisure, the decomposition analysis indicates that the policy had a positive 
effect on male workers’ satisfaction with leisure without any significant effect on the females. 
4.4.2 Income Heterogeneity 
Another way to identify heterogeneity in the response to the policy is to estimate the impact of 
the policy on a subsample based on household income levels. In this section, we estimate the 
policy’s impact on the well-being of workers whose household income is above the average 
household income and that of those whose income is below or equal to the average. The average 
annual household income of both the eligible and non-eligible workers in the full sample is 
approximately KRW36,368,590. 
Table 4.16: Heterogeneity by Income Level – Life Satisfaction and Job Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Life Satisfaction   Job Satisfaction   
Panel A: Above Average Household Income  
Post  -0.0503 -0.0987
 (0.093) (0.094)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.0312 0.1327
 (0.100) (0.102)
Individual Controls YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES 
Observations 6,399 6,381 
R2 0.537 0.564 
   
Panel B: Below Average Household Income  
Post  -0.3051*** -0.0489
 (0.087) (0.068) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.2266* 0.0873 
 (0.087) (0.079) 
Individual Controls YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES 
Observations 10,828 10,799 
R2 0.482 0.483 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. Panel A consists of workers whose total household income is above the average and 
Panel B contains workers whose average income is below or equal to the average. The individual control variables 
include log of household income, age, marriage dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the 
level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 4.16 reports the results of the income heterogeneity estimation for life satisfaction and 
job satisfaction. Column (1) Panel B shows that the policy had a statistically significant positive 
effect (increased by 0.23 standard deviations) on the life satisfaction of the low- and average-
income workers whereas it did not have any significant effect on that of the high-income 
workers. This means the increase in overall life satisfaction was driven by the low- and average-
income workers whose life satisfaction increased due to the policy. 
Table 4.17: Heterogeneity by Income Level - Other Measures of Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Work 
Hours     
Wage/ 
Earnings  
Household 
Income     
Leisure   Family 
Relations   
Social 
Relations   
Panel A: Above 
Average Household 
Income 
      
Post  -0.3254*** 0.1295 0.1367 -0.0374 -0.1844 -0.0503
 (0.091) (0.088) (0.119) (0.098) (0.105) (0.126)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.2790** -0.0467 -0.1097 0.1096 0.1109 0.0719
 (0.098) (0.096) (0.124) (0.113) (0.107) (0.134)
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6,396 6,395 6,395 6,392 6,392 6,392
R2 0.551 0.563 0.563 0.510 0.494 0.466
   
Panel B: Below 
Average Household 
Income 
      
Post  -0.1737* 0.0293 0.0595 -0.0971 -0.4093*** -0.3022***
 (0.077) (0.087) (0.089) (0.081) (0.098) (0.078) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.2186** 0.0278 -0.1083 0.0625 0.3734*** 0.2022*
 (0.079) (0.090) (0.096) (0.088) (0.101) (0.086)
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 10,827 10,835 10,831 10,832 10,831 10,830
R2 0.482 0.450 0.505 0.471 0.470 0.450
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variable is used. Panel A consists of workers whose total household income is above the average and 
Panel B contains workers whose average income is below or equal to the average. The individual control variables 
include log of household income, age, marriage dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the 
level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Moreover, we estimate the income heterogeneity in the impact of the policy on the channels of 
life and job satisfaction. Table 4.17 reports the results of the income heterogeneity estimation 
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for satisfaction with work hours, wages/earnings, leisure, household income, family relations, 
and social relations. While the policy increased the satisfaction with work hours of both income 
groups, there exists a modest disparity of 0.06 standard deviations in the magnitude of the 
impact among the two groups (0.28 standard deviations for the high-income workers and 0.22 
for the low- and average-income workers). Panel B column (5) and column (6) respectively 
show 0.37 and 0.20 standard deviations increase in satisfaction with family relations and 
satisfaction with social relations for the low- and average-income workers. However, in Panel 
A, we find that except for satisfaction with work hours, there was no significant impact on the 
high-income workers. This also indicates that the majority of the increase in life satisfaction 
was driven by an increase in the life-related satisfaction channels of the low- and average-
income workers.  
4.4.3 Age Heterogeneity 
There could also be heterogeneity in the response to the policy based on the age of the workers. 
In this section, we examine the differences in response to the policy based on two age groupings 
– Group A is composed of workers who are between 20 and 40 years old whereas Group B is 
made up of workers who are above 40 years old. This distinction assumes that at ages between 
20 and 40, workers have active lives and might either require more leisure time for their social 
activities or might want to devote more time to their work to make progress in their career. On 
the other hand, workers who are over 40 years old are relatively not active. Furthermore, their 
health and energy levels may not support long hours of work. Thus, they would prefer shorter 
working hours. Therefore, whilst the expected response for the younger workers is ambiguous, 
we expect the older workers to respond positively to the policy. 
Table 4.18 reports the results of the age heterogeneity estimation for overall life satisfaction 
and job satisfaction. While there was an increase in the life satisfaction of the older workers, 
there was no significant impact on that of the younger workers. Specifically, the overall life 
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satisfaction of the workers above 40 years old increased by 0.22 standard deviations. This 
means the increase in life satisfaction was mainly driven by older workers whose life 
satisfaction increased due to the policy. However, the job satisfaction of both groups was not 
statistically impacted by the policy. This is consistent with our prediction of a positive response 
from the older workers. 
Table 4.18: Heterogeneity by Age – Life Satisfaction and Job Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Life Satisfaction   Job Satisfaction   
Panel B: Above 40 years   
Post -0.2207** -0.1177
 (0.072) (0.104)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.2180** 0.1808
 (0.076) (0.100)
Individual Controls YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES 
Observations 8,295 8,275
R2 0.520 0.526
  
Panel A: 40 years and Below   
Post -0.2318** -0.0170
 (0.081) (0.079)
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.1650 0.0882
 (0.086) (0.089)
Individual Controls YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES 
Observations 8,932 8,905
R2 0.483 0.486
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variables is used. Panel A contains workers who are 40 years and below and Panel B consists of workers 
who are over 40 years old. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate).  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Similarly, we analyze the possibility of age heterogeneity in the impact of the policy on the life 
and job satisfaction channels. Table 4.19 reports the results of the age heterogeneity estimation 
for satisfaction with work hours, wages/earnings, leisure, household income, family relations, 
and social relations. Column (1) shows that the policy increased satisfaction with work hours 
of both age groups. Panel A, column 1 indicates that the satisfaction with work hours of the 
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younger workers increased by 0.34 standard deviations which is higher than that of the older 
workers (Panel B, column 1) which increased by 0.22 standard deviations. Column (5) 
indicates policy had a positive effect on satisfaction with family relations of both groups of 
workers and that there is no significant difference in the impact on both workers. Furthermore, 
in column (6) we find that the younger workers’ satisfaction with social relations increased by 
0.25 standard deviations whereas that of the older workers did not change. 
Table 4.19: Heterogeneity by Age - Other Measures of Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Work 
Hours     
Wage/ 
Earnings   
Household 
Income     
Leisure   Family 
Relations   
Social 
Relations   
Panel A: Above 40 
years  
      
Post  -0.1612 0.0689 0.0684 -0.1191 -0.2779** -0.1092 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.094) (0.073) (0.089) (0.104) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.2239* -0.0374 -0.1002 0.0826 0.2585** 0.1134 
 (0.106) (0.101) (0.112) (0.081) (0.095) (0.114) 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,300 8,302 8,296 8,295 8,294 8,293 
R2 0.501 0.515 0.572 0.497 0.470 0.441 
       
Panel B: 40 years 
and Below  
      
Post  -0.3280*** 0.0827 0.0182 -0.0894 -0.3479*** -0.3106***
 (0.075) (0.098) (0.080) (0.098) (0.081) (0.081) 
DID (Post x Eligibility) 0.3391*** 0.0227 -0.0320 0.0968 0.2300** 0.2532** 
 (0.076) (0.101) (0.085) (0.112) (0.084) (0.090) 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Size Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,923 8,928 8,930 8,929 8,929 8,929 
R2 0.478 0.468 0.523 0.447 0.450 0.418 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm size times year are shown in parentheses. The standardized form of the 
dependent variables is used. Panel A contains workers who are 40 years and below and Panel B consists of workers 
who are over 40 years old. The individual control variables include log of household income, age, marriage 
dummy, number of kids (0yrs to high school), 8 dummies of the level of education (1=No Schooling; 8=Doctorate). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
5.1 Discussion of Findings  
In this section, we put forward an overview of the findings, what they mean and their 
implications. The trends in the changes in work hours indicate that, overall, work hours in 
Korea continue to decrease rapidly. However, an interesting revelation is that whilst the regular 
work hours of full-time workers who used to work more than the specified work hours (40 
hours per week) before the policy continue to decrease, that of part-time workers and regular 
workers who used to work less than 40 hours before 2004 continued to increase until 2011 
when it began to drop. According to Seong (2005), this could be an indication that employers 
tried to absorb the reduced work hours of their employees by increasing the work hours of full-
time workers who were working less than 40 hours and/or increasing the work hours of their 
part-time workers or even possible employing more part-time workers.  This means whilst the 
intensive margin of the full-time workers decreased, that of part-time workers and 
“underutilized’ full-time workers increased. Between 2003 and 2004, more part-time workers 
were hired in firms with over 1000 workers, whilst the number of part-time workers in firms 
with less than 1000 employees reduced (Seong, 2005). 
Furthermore, we found that between work hours and happiness (both life satisfaction and job 
satisfaction), the relationship is inverted U-shaped. This is consistent with the extant literature 
(Rätzel, 2009; Knabe & Rätzel, 2010; Muffels & Kempermann, 2011; Collewet & Loog, 2015; 
Wang, 2015).  However, there was no significant relationship between family well-being and 
work hours. The relationship is said to be inverted U-shaped because at very low hours of work, 
any increment in work hours relates to a corresponding increase in well-being. However, as 
work hours continue to increase, its positive effect on well-being reaches a maximum (no 
change) and then begins to decline. This point at which an increase in work hours maximizes 
well-being is known as the optimum work hours. We find that the optimum work hours differ 
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for both job and life satisfaction; while job satisfaction is maximized at 43 hours per week, life 
satisfaction is maximized at 48 hours per week. However, the majority of the workers have 
their average weekly work hours above the optimum work hours. 
Moreover, as expected, the policy analysis revealed that the work hour reduction policy had a 
negative impact on average weekly work hours. In other words, the policy decreased the 
average weekly work hours by about 5.6 hours. Further decomposition of this impact revealed 
that the change in work hours of the female and male workers was statistically similar. Likewise, 
the policy caused an increment in life satisfaction and its related channels, including 
satisfaction with family relations and social relations. The biggest impact of the policy was 
realized in the satisfaction with work hours followed by satisfaction with social relations. 
However, there was no overall impact on job satisfaction and one of its related channels, 
satisfaction with wages/earnings. Similarly, there was no overall impact on some life 
satisfaction-related channels such as satisfaction with leisure and household income. These 
results, therefore, confirm the hypothesis of the study and the objective of the policy that well-
being increases when working hours are reduced. Besides, even with the results which are not 
statistically significant, we find that the direction of change is consistent with our expectations. 
We argue that there are three possible explanations for the failure of the policy to have the 
expected positive impact on job satisfaction. Firstly, the optimum work hours required to 
maximize job satisfaction are around 43 hours, however, under this policy, the standard number 
of hours per week is 40 hours plus an extra 12 hours of overtime work hours. Therefore, a 
reduction to a level that is 3 hours lower or including overtime hours which makes work hours 
still higher than the optimum working hours might rather reduce job satisfaction. Secondly, 
although work hours reduced as seen in the results, employers might have tried to absorb the 
lost time by increasing the work intensity or modifying the format of holidays and leave (Seong, 
2005; Rudolf, 2014). In fact, Rudolf (2014), using a sample of 899 workers, found a 9.7% 
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increase in the probability that work intensity increased after the reduction in the statutory work 
hours. This means workers would have to do the same amount of work, but now, in a shorter 
period of time. Thus, while they had the chance to go home early, they were expected to do 
more work per hour than before. Thus, increased work intensity might counteract any 
increment in job satisfaction effect of the policy. Bakker et al. (2006) argue that an increase in 
the intensity of work can negatively affect employee well-being (job satisfaction) due to 
increased stress levels. Finally, it could also be because some employers did not comply with 
the said policy; eligible workers, especially those in the private sector used in the analysis of 
this study, might not have actually gotten their work hours reduced. However, there is not 
enough data in the KLIPS dataset to confirm this assumption. 
We also evaluated the impact of the policy on the income of the workers using their nominal 
average monthly wages as a proxy for their labor income. We found no statistically significant 
effect. However, although the estimates are not significant, their direction of change contains 
interesting information. It shows that there was an increase in average monthly wages of about 
KRW 60,000. As stated earlier, this cannot be significantly attributed to the policy. A better 
proxy for measuring the effect on income would have been the average annual earned income. 
However, this information is not included in the dataset until 2003 (our analysis is based on 
data from 2001 to 2009). 
Additionally, we found that the policy had no significant impact on average weekly overtime 
work hours even though the average hourly wage went up by about 5 percentage points. In fact, 
although not significant, the sign of change in overtime work was negative. This could be a 
confirmation that the workers became happier (increased life satisfaction) after the reduction 
in their work hours so they decided not to compensate for the ‘lost’ time. This is consistent 
with the prediction in our conceptual framework that if the utility of workers increases they 
may either not change their overtime hours or even reduce overtime work. Nonetheless, care 
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must be taken when interpreting this argument since the decision to work overtime may depend 
on the availability of overtime work and approval from the employer. Furthermore, the policy 
did not only change work hours but also modified the definitions of overtime hours and the 
required remuneration. 
To reveal any heterogeneity in the impact of the policy, we conducted various decomposition 
analysis based on gender, age, and household income levels. We found that while the policy 
had no effect on the life and job satisfaction of the female workers, it generated a significant 
increase in the life satisfaction of the male workers. Similarly, while there was a positive effect 
on the satisfaction with work hours of the male workers, there was no such impact on the female 
workers. Interestingly, even though there was no overall impact of the policy on satisfaction 
with leisure, we found that the policy increased the male workers' satisfaction with leisure. 
Finally, while there was a positive impact on the female workers’ satisfaction with both family 
relations and social relations, only the satisfaction with family relations of the male workers 
was positively affected. This indicates that while there might be similarities in the response to 
the policies, there are also significant gender differences with regard to the impact of the policy.  
The study also reveals that whilst the policy increased the life satisfaction of the older workers 
(above 40 years old), there was no significant impact on the younger workers (ages 20 to 40).  
Also, the impact on satisfaction with work hours, although positive for both age groups, was 
significantly higher among the younger workers. Moreover, while there was an increase in the 
satisfaction with family relations, the magnitude of the impact for both groups of workers was 
similar. Finally, the policy had a positive effect on the younger workers’ satisfaction with social 
relations but did not have any impact on that of the older workers. This indicates that the well-
being and free time needs of younger workers are different from that of the older workers. 
 
53 
 
Finally, we found that the increase in life satisfaction was driven by the workers whose 
household income is below or equal to the average household income of about KRW 36 million. 
Similarly, the positive impact of the policy on satisfaction with both family and social relations 
was exclusive to the low- and average-income workers. Moreover, although there was a 
positive impact on both groups’ satisfaction with work hours, it was more dominant among the 
high-income workers. These findings indicate that the policy impacted low- and average-
income workers more than their high-income counterparts. The possible explanation for this 
could be the wage effect of the policy; they receive the same wages for relatively fewer hours 
of work (increase in base hourly wages) as found in this study. 
5.2 Limitations of the Study 
Whilst we are confident about the internal validity of this study and have also shown that the 
findings are robust to different specifications, care must be taken when interpreting its external 
validity or generalizing the results. This is because the design and implementation of the policy, 
as well as the policy-setting, might differ from other contexts. Furthermore, there are numerous 
unobservable determinants of happiness such as cultural values and perceptions of well-being 
which might differ across countries and regions. Thus, the findings in this study cannot be a 
general representation of how people across the globe or in different regions would respond to 
a statutory reduction in working hours. Notwithstanding, the findings could be of great help to 
polciymakers and researchers across the globe. 
Secondly, the findings of this study are restricted to the assumption that all eligible workers 
had a reduction in their work hours at the designated time. This assumption may be difficult to 
confirm due to data limitations. In other words, the study assumes 100% compliance with the 
requirements of the policy since the dataset does not have enough information on the 
compliance rate. Non-compliance can introduce bias in the estimates; this could either 
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overestimate or underestimate the effect on well-being. Thus, the results should be taken as 
based on an intention-to-treat (ITT) estimation.  
Moreover, the analysis is based on workers’ self-reported firm size which might not be accurate. 
This is because some workers might not accurately know the number of employees at the firm, 
especially when the firm is relatively big. Similarly, the work hour variable used is based on 
the employees' reported figures; as seen from the analysis, some workers reported as high as 
148 hours per week which is unrealistic. Inaccuracies in the reported firm sizes and work hours 
may affect the grouping of the workers into control and treatment groups. The best option 
would have been to use employer reported firm size and work hours. However, limitations in 
the dataset do not allow this. Notwithstanding, the specifications used for the analysis 
eliminates some of these measurement errors.  
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CONCLUSION 
This paper evaluates the effect of statutory reductions in work hours on the subjective well-
being of workers. Generally, the findings indicate that the policy had a positive impact on life 
satisfaction but had no significant impact on job satisfaction. Further analysis revealed that this 
positive impact on life satisfaction was through increases in satisfaction with work hours, 
family relations, and social relations. Furthermore, regarding heterogeneity, the policy effect 
was more compelling among male workers, older workers, and low- and average-income 
workers.  The study further revealed that the current work hour arrangement pegs working 
hours higher than the optimum working hours. Thus, we recommend that any future efforts to 
improve workers’ well-being through work hour reduction should target the optimum working 
hours to maximize the well-being of workers. Moreover, since the findings show that the policy 
does not benefit different groups of workers equally, alternative and/or complementary policy 
efforts should be made to increase the well-being of those groups of workers whose subjective 
well-being was not significantly impacted by the policy, including female workers, younger 
workers, and high-income workers. Although these insights are based on data from Korea, 
other countries with long work hours can take lessons from this study to improve the well-
being of its workers. 
Further research can include information on the compliance rate. Knowledge of the extent to 
which employers complied with the regulation to reduce work hours would help tell a full story 
about the impact of the policy. Secondly, it is expected that when work hours are reduced, 
workers would use the new ‘free time’ for self-development, leisure activities, family activities, 
etc. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has focused on how workers use their 
time after work hours are reduced. This is important because, research has shown that increased 
leisure time may increase unhealthy lifestyles such as smoking, alcoholism, etc. Therefore, 
future studies can try to fill this gap.  
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